R47597 — India-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress

India, home to more than one-sixth of global population, became the world’s most populous country in 2023 and the fifth-largest global economy in 2025. Many factors contribute to the “great power” aspirations expressed by India’s government and many of its people: the country’s rich civilization and history; expanding strategic horizons; increased engagement with international partners; and a geographic setting—with more than 9,000 miles of land borders, many of them disputed—astride vital sea and energy lanes. Its status as one of the fastest growing major economies has given rise to an expanding middle class; greater defense and power projection capabilities (replete with a nuclear weapons arsenal and triad of delivery systems); and vigorous space, science, technology, and other industrial sectors. In recognition of India’s increasing ability to influence world affairs—and with a widely held assessment that a stronger and more prosperous democratic India is good for the United States—the U.S. Congress and five successive U.S. Administrations have since 2001 acted to both broaden and deepen U.S. engagement with India. The U.S. and Indian governments formally launched a “strategic partnership” in 2005, along with a framework for long-term defense cooperation that now includes large-scale joint military exercises and significant defense trade. In concert with Japan and Australia, the United States and India in 2017 reinvigorated the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (“Quad”) as a flagship initiative in the U.S. Indo-Pacific Strategy during the first Trump Administration. The mechanism is widely viewed, at least in part, as a counter to China’s growing influence, although some observers question whether the strategic interests of Quad members are sufficiently aligned for collective action. U.S.-India trade and investment has increased in recent decades, while a relatively wealthy Indian-American community has exercised newfound domestic political influence, and Indian nationals are accounting for a large proportion of foreign students on American college campuses and foreign workers in the information technology sector. At the same time, more engagement has meant more areas of friction in the partnership, including some that attract congressional attention. India’s economy, for example, has barriers to trade and investment that can deter foreign investment. Recent U.S. Administrations also have taken issue with India’s cooperative engagements with Russia, a country with which India has long-standing ties. Differences over U.S. immigration law, especially in the area of nonimmigrant work visas, remain unresolved. India’s intellectual property protection regime comes under regular criticism from U.S. officials and firms. Meanwhile, cooperation in the fields of defense trade, intelligence, and counterterrorism, although progressing rapidly and improved relative to that of only a decade ago, has run up against institutional and political obstacles. Moreover, past U.S. Administrations and some Members of Congress have taken notice of human rights issues in India, including those related to democratic backsliding and infringements on religious freedom. Despite areas of discord, the U.S. Congress has remained broadly positive in its posture toward the U.S.-India strategic and commercial partnership. The second Trump Administration has acknowledged that a free, open, and prosperous Indo-Pacific region remains vital to advancing shared U.S. and Indian interests, but has also expressed differences over trade and immigration, and has maintained a contrasting political narrative around India’s May 2025 conflict with Pakistan. In strategy documents, the Administration appears to have deemphasized the importance of both the Indo-Pacific region and India’s role therein. Congressional oversight and legislation have affected—and may continue to affect—the course of U.S.-India relations, including in areas such as resourcing for a U.S. Indo-Pacific strategy, trade and investment (including bilateral defense trade) relations, technology sharing and export controls, immigration policy, nuclear weapons proliferation, and human rights.

Curated by CRS — every bill listed in this report's relatedMaterials. Edge type cited_in_report, gold confidence.

• HR 7506 — Decreasing Russian Oil Profits Act of 2026 · 119th Cong
• HR 5300 — Department of State Policy Provisions Act · 119th Cong
• HR 5175 — Quad Space Act · 119th Cong
• HR 3838 — Streamlining Procurement for Effective Execution and Delivery and National Defense Authorization Act · 119th Cong
• S 3513 — Decreasing Russian Oil Profits Act of 2025 · 119th Cong
• HR 3307 — Eastern Mediterranean Gateway Act · 119th Cong
• S 2380 — Quad Economic Security Act · 119th Cong
• S 2296 — National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2026 · 119th Cong
• S 1946 — Quad Space Act · 119th Cong
• HR 1263 — Strengthening the Quad Act · 119th Cong
• S 554 — United States-Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025 · 119th Cong
• SRES 549 — A resolution urging the Trump Administration to seize shadow fleet vessels transporting sanctioned o · 119th Cong
• HJRES 134 — Terminating the national emergency declared to impose duties on articles imported from India. · 119th Cong
• HRES 68 — Expressing strong disapproval of the President's announcement to withdraw the United States from the · 119th Cong
• HR 4312 — To enhance the eligibility of India for Foreign Military Sales and exports under the Arms Export Con · 118th Cong
• S 2096 — A bill to enhance the eligibility of India for Foreign Military Sales and exports under the Arms Exp · 118th Cong
• HRES 540 — Reaffirming the state of Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory and condemning the People's Republic · 118th Cong
• SRES 75 — A resolution reaffirming the state of Arunachal Pradesh as Indian territory and condemning the Peopl · 118th Cong